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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
LAYTON CITY,

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

Case No. 920483-CA

v,
WILLIAM A. ATWOOD,

Argument Priority No. 2
r

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This appeal arises from a jury verdict and conviction in the
Second Circuit Court Layton Department.
§

78-2a-3(2) (d) ,

the

Utah

Court

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
of

Appeals

has

appellate

jurisdiction over criminal appeals from the circuit courts.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court is presented with the following issues on appeal:
1.

Whether Defendant's motion to suppress the blood test

results of the blood sample drawn to determine the alcohol content
of Defendant's blood at the time he was operating a motor vehicle
was properly denied.
2.

Whether the admission into evidence of the blood test, if

error, was harmless error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for each of the issues presented is as
follows:
1

Motion to Suppress.

This Court reviews the factual findings

underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard.

The Court

reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on these facts
under a correctness standard.
23 (Utah App. 1993);

State v. Gurule, 216 Utah Adv. Rep.

State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah

1992); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991).
Harmless

Error.

In reviewing

the

admission

of

evidence

erroneously admitted pursuant to a denial of a motion to suppress,
the test for harmless error in cases not involving constitutional
rights

is whether,

absent

the

error,

there

was

a

reasonable

likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.

State v.

Lanier 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919
(Utah 1987); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULE
Utah Code Ann. § 26-1-30 (1992)
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(5) (a) (1992)
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5 (1992)
Utah Admin Code R. 440-12.2 (1992)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant

was

cited

for

driving

under

the

influence

of

alcohol, a Class "A" misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44(3) (a) and several other traffic offenses.

Defendant filed

a motion to suppress the results of the blood test asserting that
the

blood

draw

was

not

conducted
2

in

conformance

with

the

requirements of § 41-6-44.10(5) (a) and therefore was inadmissable.
On June 30, 1993, the matter came before
Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

the trial court

on

A witness for the prosecution,

Craig Woodall, an airman from Hill Air Force Base, did not appear.
Testimony was taken from Deputy Paramedic Neal L. Wagner and the
matter was argued before the Court. The Court continued the matter
to give the prosecution the opportunity to produce Craig Woodall.
A mix-up in scheduling resulted in the Court's not taking testimony
from Woodall at the continued suppression hearing and ruling on
Defendant's motion on July 9, 1993, just prior to the scheduled
jury trial.

The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress

and the results of the blood test were ultimately admitted into
evidence.
After hearing evidence

and argument, the jury returned

verdict of guilty of driving under the influence.
traffic charges were dismissed.

The

a

other

This appeal stems from the trial

court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress and the subsequent
jury verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 28, 1992, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Diana Evans, a
Layton resident, was traveling south in her Astro Van on Adamswood
Road (approximately 350 North, 1200 East) , a narrow, two lane, unlined, curving road in Layton
(hereinafter "Evans T . " ) .

(Evans Transcript, pages 5, 13.)

As she rounded a corner in the road at

a speed of about 20 to 25 m.p.h. (Evans T. 13), she observed a red
ATV

three-wheeler

driven

by

Defendant.
3

Defendant's

ATV

was

traveling at a high rate of speed nnd was attempting to maneuver
the corner. Defendant's vehicle was in Ms, Evans' lane of • J -*vel.
As Defendant swerved to the right, attempting to return to his lane
of travel, the ATV tipnp.e

•. e , throwing Defendant and a passenger,

Defendant's 7-8 year O"J daughter, from the vehicle.

Ms. Evans

witnessed the spiiJ ::-a iida to take evasive action, pulling to the
right and down into a gully to the side of I he road, in order to
avoid hitting the ATV, Defendant and his daughter. (Evans T. 3-5.)
Moments after the accident, Ms. Evans made contact with the
Defendant and his daughter.

The Defendant was trying

helmet off but was having a difficult time.
that Defendant and his daughter w* re injured.

get his

Ms. Evans could see
However, when Ms.

Evans indicated she was going to call an ambulance or the police,
Mr. Atwood strenuous]y objected. (Evans T
the Defendant sit down and contacted l Jit* pu

Ms. Evans had
-twood stood

again and tried to leave the scene by attempting to push his
vehicle--stii

i its side — again stating that he did not want to

wait for the police to arrive.

(Evans T. I.)

While Ms. Evans was waiting for the police and paramedics to
arrive, she tried to talk with Defendaiit in hopes of keeping him
calm and alert. She noticed that his speech was slurred and asked
if he had been drinking. Defendant indicated he had "a few beers."
(Evans T. 9.)

Officer Grubb was the first officer on the scene.

When questioned by Officer Grubb, Defendant did not respond.

At

that time, Officer Grubb observed that the Defendant was distant
and incoherent. (Grubb T. 1, 5-6).
4

Officer Hein arrived and made contact with Defendant shortlyafter the paramedics arrived on the scene.

He kneeled behind

Defendant's right shoulder while the paramedics attended to the
Defendant.

Officer Hein observed at that time that Defendant's

speech was slurred, that he appeared to be somewhat incoherent and
that

there was

a distinct

odor of alcohol

coming

from

the

Defendant. (Hein T". 5) When asked how much alcohol he had consumed
prior to the accident, the Defendant responded that "he couldn't
remember." (Hein T. 6)
Defendant and his daughter were transported to Hill Air Force
Base Emergency Room at Defendant's request.1

(Atwood T. 14)

Officer Hein made contact with Defendant at the emergency room and
observed that the defendant appeared to be much more coherent and
alert than he had been at the accident scene.

Defendant was

sitting up and conversing with individuals in the emergency room.
The medical staff were focusing their attention on Defendant's
daughter.

There was no medical personnel working on or attending

to Mr. Atwood.

(Hein T. 10) When Officer Hein asked the Defendant

how he felt, he stated he was "feeling better."

(Hein T. 11.)

Officer Hein informed the Defendant that he had reason to
believe that the Defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol and asked if he would perform a few tests.
agreed to do so.

The Defendant

(Hein T. 11.) Officer Hein administered standard

field sobriety tests including the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the

defendant was, at the time, active duty military, stationed
a Hill Air Force Base.
5

alphabet and the finger count.
satisfactorily perform

Based on Defendant's inability to

the tests, Officer Hein concluded

that

Defendant was under the influence of alcohol to an extent he could
not safely operate a motor vehicle.

(Hein 6-9, 11-16.)

Defendant agreed to submit to a blood draw.

After blood was

drawn from Defendant's arm, Officer Hein asked Defendant several
questions

about

Defendant's

actions

prior

to

the

accident.

Defendant told Officer Hein that he had drank "quite a bit" and
that he did not know when he had his first drink or when he had
stopped.

He also stated that he did not know if he was under the

influence of alcohol and that he had not been involved

in an

accident that day.
Deputy Neil Wagner, a Deputy Sheriff Paramedic, administered
the blood test.

Deputy Wagner first observed the Defendant in the

emergency room at Hill Air Force Base.
Defendant

appeared

Suppression
"S.H.T.")

to

Hearing

be

intoxicated

Transcript,

page

He observed that the
at

12.)

the

time.

(hereinafter

(Wagner
Wagner

Deputy Wagner, who is qualified under Utah Code Ann. §

41-6-44.10(5)(a) and § 26-1-30 to draw blood (Wagner T. 48), used
the standard blood draw kit provided to him by Officer Hein.
(Wagner

50, Hein

17.) 2

He was

2

assisted by Craig Woodall, a

The kit provides a betadine preparation used to sterilize the
area from which the blood is to be drawn, a vacutainer, a special
needle and two blood specimen tubes. Deputy Wagoner described the
vacutainer as a three inch plastic sleeve with a diameter slightly
smaller than a quarter. The syringe, which is inserted in the vein
extends from the closed end of the vacutainer.
Blood specimen
tubes are inserted into the plastic sleeve and when pushed down a
rubber stopper surrounding another syringe inside the sleeve is
pushed back and the blood flows into the specimen tube. (Wagoner
6

certified medical laboratory technician stationed at Hill Air Force
Base (Woodall T. 38, Wagner T. 50). 3
Lab

technician

Woodall,

acting

at

the

direction

of

an

emergency room physician (Woodall T. at 39, 42), needed blood to
complete the Blood Alcohol Test and Complete Blood Count test
ordered by the attending physician.

Woodall and Wagner conversed

about how best to proceed in a manner that would not require that
the Defendant be "stuck" twice with the needle.
Woodall

applied

a tourniquet

(Wagner S.H.T. 20.)

supplied

by

(Wagner S.H.T. 13)

the emergency

The vein area was then swabbed with the

betadine preparation supplied with the state blood kit.
Woodall,

while

room.

being

observed

by

Deputy

Wagner,

Lab Tech

performed

a

standard venipuncture or "stick" in Defendant's right arm using the
vacutainer provided in the state blood draw kit.
46, Wagner T. 51, Wagner S.H.T. 16-18.)

(Woodall T. 40,

Deputy Wagner testified

that the venipuncture was completed in accordance with his own
paramedic training.

(Wagner T. 51-52, Wagner S.H.T. 16-18.)

After the venipuncture was completed, lab technician Woodall
used two of the emergency room's specimen tubes to remove the blood
needed for the hospital's purposes.

Deputy Wagner then used the

S.H.T. 15, Wagoner T. 50-51) Lab technician Woodall referred to
the apparatus described by Wagoner as the "hub". (Woodall T. 40.)
Woodall referred to the specimen tubes as "vacutainers." See
Exhibit 1 in Addendum.
3

Although the record as it now stands before the Court, does
not reflect whether Woodall was certified under Utah Code Ann. §
44-6-44(5) to perform blood draws, it was stipulated by counsel for
both parties that in fact Woodall was not certified under section
44-6-44(5). The Court should consider the stipulation as part of
the record.
7

specimen tubes provided in the blood draw kit to withdraw blood for
DUI testing purposes.

(Woodall T. 44-45, Wagner T. 51) . The blood

sample was submitted to the state toxicology lab by Officer Hein.
The results of the test showed that Defendant had been driving with
a blood alcohol level of .30 milligrams of alcohol per one hundred
milliliters of blood.

(Jepson T. 4-5.)

The defendant testified at trial that he had been preparing
his ATV for summer use after a winter storage period.

He had not

driven the vehicle since it had been stored several months earlier.
He testified that he had been drinking beer which he had purchased
at Hill Air Force Base.

Beer available on Base has a 6% alcohol

content, almost twice the 3.2% alcohol content of the beer which is
available in Utah.

(Atwood T. 11, Jeppson T. 12.)

He testified

that he had been drinking continuously since 12:00 noon.

(Atwood

T. 12) However, he stated that he drank only 4 or 5 beers between
noon and 5:30 when the accident occurred. Defendant admitted that
he was basing the numbers on his "usual" consumption.

(Atwood T.

23.)
Defendant testified that he had problems with the bike's
throttle prior to winterizing the unit for storage.

He claimed

that the throttle had stuck as he drove around the corner in the
road and the excessive speed caused the accident. However, he also
testified that even though he knew of the past problems with the
bikes

throttle,

he

did

not

feel

at

the

time

that

it was

inappropriate to take his daughter with him on the test ride.
(Atwood T. 22.)
8

Defendant further testified that he suffered a fractured jaw
as a result of the accident and extensive internal injuries which
kept him the hospital for one month. (Atwood T. 16-20) .

However,

he also testified that the emergency room doctor was going to send
him home after the doctor had verified that Defendant's jaw was
fractured.

It was only after being advised of his release and

after he had been at the hospital for some time, that he realized
that he may be suffering from internal injuries and reported his
discomfort to the doctor.

(Atwood T. 16-17.)

There was no expert

medical testimony offered.
Defendant could not remember many things about the accident or
his experiences

in the

speaking with Ms. Evans.
officers.

emergency

room.

He did not

He did not remember speaking with the

He did not remember the blood being drawn.

13-16, 23-24.)

remember

(Atwood T.

However, he gave fairly extensive and specific

testimony about his experiences at the hospital to which he was
transported

from the Base and claimed to recall several life-

threatening situations.

(Atwood T. 18-20.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's findings that the blood draw was conducted
by Deputy Wagner, an individual duly authorized, was not clearly
erroneous.

The facts support the finding and the trial court's

finding should be upheld.
The blood draw was conducted in substantial compliance, if not
strict compliance, with the statue and therefore was properly
admitted into evidence.

Lab Technician Woodall's involvement in
9

the blood draw was minimal.

Furthermore, Woodall

is clearly

qualified to hold a permit under the statute, however his unique
situation in the military makes the permit unnecessary for his
daily tasks.
The blood draw results were properly admitted under general
principals of evidence and pursuant to § 41-6-44.5. Non-compliance
with the implied consent laws only causes the test results to loose
the

presumption

of

admissibility.

Any

competent,

relevant

evidence, including evidence of blood test results, is admissible
upon the laying of a proper foundation.
Any error in the admission of the blood test results was
harmless

error

as

there

was

other

overwhelming

evidence

of

Defendant's guilt.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE BLOOD DRAW WAS CONDUCTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) .
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

physician, registered

41-6-44.10 (5) (a) provides

that

nurse, practical nurse or an

only

a

individual

holding a permit issued by the State Health Department may draw
blood

for
4

DUI

testing

purposes.4

The

trial

court

correctly

Section 41-6-44.10(5) (a) provides as follows:

Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or
person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the
request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to
determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation
does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath
specimen.
Section 26-1-30 reads in pertinent part as follows:
10

concluded that the blood sample in question was drawn by Deputy
Wagner, an authorized individual.

The court found that there is

much more to drawing blood than simply inserting a needle in a
person's vein and that the actual blood draw occurred when Deputy
Wagner placed the vacutainer tube on the second needle.

(See

S.H.T. July 9, 1992, 2-3).
The
findings.

facts

before

Although

this
Lab

Court

support

Technician

the

Woodall

trial

court's

performed

the

venipuncture, no blood was removed from the Defendant's arm until
Deputy Wagner placed the vacutainer tubes obtained from the state
blood-draw kit inside the hub and broke the seal with the needle.
This Court cannot find that the trial court's findings are
clearly erroneous on this matter.

Therefore, the trial court's

ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be affirmed and
Defendant's conviction upheld.5
(2) In addition to all other powers and duties of the
department, it shall have and exercise the following
powers and duties:
* * *

(r)
establish qualifications for individuals
permitted to draw blood pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10,
and to issue permits to individuals it finds qualified,
which permits may be terminated or revoked by the
department;
defendant's reliance on Gibb v. Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (Utah
1975) is misplaced. The statute in question has been amended and
no longer contains the language relied on by the Defendant in Gibb.
The pertinent statute at the time the Gibb case was decided read as
follows:
Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or
duly authorized laboratory technician, acting at the
request of a police officer can withdraw blood for the
purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content
11

POINT II: THE BLOOD DRAW WAS CONDUCTED IN SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE THE REQUIREMENTS OF § 41-6-44.10(5)(a).
The facts of this case show that the blood draw was conducted
in substantial
requirements

of

compliance, if not strict compliance, with the
§

41-6-44.10 (5) (a) .

It

is

clear

that

the

legislative intent behind the requirements set forth in § 41-644,10(5) (a) were established not only to protect the health and
welfare of the person from whom the blood is being drawn but also
to maintain the reliability of the blood sample

itself.

The

legislature wanted to ensure that medically trained and competent
individuals

complete

the

bloods

draws

authorized

44.10(5) (a) using medically acceptable procedures.
Barnick, 477 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1991);

in

§ 41-6-

See State v.

Greaves v. North Dakota State

Highway Commissioner, 432 N.W.2d 879 (N.D. 1988);

State v. Hanson,

345 N.D.2d 845, 849-50 (N.D. 1984)
Lab Technician Woodall's involvement in Defendant's blood draw
in no way endangered the Defendant or affected the reliability of
the blood

sample.

It

is clear

from

his

testimony

that

Lab

Technician Woodall was qualified to hold a permit from the State
Health Department.6
therein

He testified that he had completed 15 months

....

Furthermore, the case should be given little or no weight
since the Supreme Court, while refraining specifically to overrule
the case, stated in State v. Durrant, 561 P. 2d 1056 (Utah 1977)
that the decision is "of small value since it was decided by a
divided court three to two, and two of the three members who
favored the decision are no longer with the court . . . ."
6

Rule R440-12.2 of the Utah Administrative Code provides as
follows:
12

of training and that he was certified with the American Society of
Clinical Pathologists as a Medical Laboratory Technician.
T. 37-38.)

(Woodall

Because of his association with the U.S. Air Force, Lab

Technician Woodall did not need Utah State certification to perform
his duties.7
Deputy Wagner testified that the venipuncture was performed in
accordance with his own training and experience.

All of

the

equipment used in the blood draw--all except the tourniquet which

R440-12.2 Authorized Individual - Qualifications.
Pursuant to section 26-1-30(19), Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, individuals other than physicians,
registered nurses, or practical nurses shall meet one of
the following requirements as a prerequisite for
authorization to withdraw blood for the purpose of
determining its alcoholic or drug content when requested
to do so by a peace officer.
A.
Training
in
blood
withdrawal
procedures
(venipuncture) obtained as a defined part of a
successfully completed college or university course taken
for credit, or
B.
Training
in blood
withdrawal
procedures
(venipuncture) obtained
as a defined part of a
successfully completed training course which prepares
individuals to function in routine clinical or emeirgency
medical situations under the guidance of a physician, or
C. Training of no less than three weeks duration in
blood withdrawal procedures (venipuncture) under the
guidance of a licensed physician.
D. Individuals actively engaged in performing blood
withdrawal procedures (venipuncture) at the time these
rules become effective and who have been so engaged for
a six-month period immediately preceding the effective
date, but not meeting one of the above requirements, are
eligible for authorization by a peace officer.
7

The Court should consider that Defendant was taken to the
hospital at Hill Air Force Base at his own request. It would seem
to fly in the face of justice to allow Defendant to succeed on his
claim that a state law was violated because a participant in the
blood draw who was on a federal installation and subject only to
federal jurisdiction did not have a state permit.
13

is not provided with the state blood draw kit--came from the state
blood draw kit.

Deputy Wagner, an authorized individual, withdrew

the blood for blood alcohol testing purposes.
If this Court finds that the blood draw was not completed in
strict compliance with § 41-6-44.10(5) (a), then there is sufficient
evidence to support the finding that the blood draw was completed
in substantial compliance with that section.

The Court should

affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress
based on the fact that the blood draw was completed in substantial
compliance, if not strict compliance, with the requirements of §
41-6-44.10(5) (a) .
POINT III: THE BLOOD TEST RESULTS WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED
PURSUANT TO § 41-6-44.5.
Section 41-6-44.5 governs the admissibility of chemical test
results in action for driving under the influence of alcohol.

This

section specifically states that a court may receive "otherwise
admissible evidence" regarding a defendant's blood alcohol level at
the time he was driving.8
8

Section 41-6-44.5 provides a presumption

Section 41-6-44.5 provides as follows:

(1)
In any action or proceeding in which it is
material to prove that a person was operating or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a
chemical
test
or
tests
as authorized
in
Section
41.6.44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(2)
If the chemical test was taken more than two
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical
control, the test result is admissible as evidence of the
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the
alleged operating or actual physical control, but the
trier of fact shall determine what weight is given to the
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of admissibility of tests conducted in accordance with § 41-644.10(5) (a).

Therefor^

tests taken in deviation from

§ 41-6-

44.10(5)(a) may lose the presumption of admissibility, but may be
admitted as evidence pursuant to the rules of evidence upon the
laying of a proper foundation as "otherwise admissible evidence."
See

State

v.

Bowers,

716

P.2d

471

(Colo.

1986) (substantial

compliance with breath test requirements and proper

foundation

provided for admissibility of test results) ; State v. Drdak, 411
S.E.2d 604

(N.C. 1992)(blood test not conducted with statutory

guidelines admissible on other grounds).

But See State v. Ibsen,

735 P.2d 957 (Hawaii App. 1987), State v. Barnick, 477 N.W.2d 200
(N.D. 1991) and Robertson v. State, 604 So.@d 783

(Fla. 1992)

(holding suppression proper when blood not drawn by person not
authorized by law.)
The Defendant in State v. Sterger, 808 P. 2d 122 (Utah App.
1991), presented this Court with the exact question Defendant now
proposes;

should the blood test results have been

suppressed

because the blood sample was taken by persons not authorized to
draw blood pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (5) (a) .

In

Sterger, this Court found § 41-6-44.10(5) (a) inapplicable, but
noted that the Court's Oregon counterpart held under similar facts
that "defects in administering such a test go to the weight to be

result of the test.
(3)
This section does not prevent a court from
receiving otherwise
admissible evidence as to a
defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level
at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical
control.
15

given its results by the trier of fact, but do not make the results
inadmissible."

Sterger, at 128, n.7.9

The Prosecution laid the proper foundation for the admission
of the blood test at trial.

Lab Technician Woodall and Deputy

Wagoner testified regarding the procedure for drawing the blood.
The chain of evidence was established by testimony and stipulation.
Barbara Jepson, the prosecution's expert witness, testified to her
qualifications and experience in analyzing blood specimens and to
the results of
foundation

for

the test.
the

There was

admission

of

"otherwise admissible evidence."

sufficient

the blood

test

and proper
results

as

The fact that the test may not

have been conducted in strict compliance with the law goes to the
weight to be given the evidence, a decision strictly within the
providence of the jury.
This Court should consider that suppression of evidence is a
drastic

remedy

and

is

constitutional rights.
evidentiary

generally

confined

to

violations

of

The issue before the Court is one of

admissibility

and not

constitutional

suppression.

There is no language in the statutes pertaining to DUI drug testing
that expressly conditions the admissibility of breath or blood
testing on strict compliance with § 41-6-44.10(5) (a).

In fact, §

9

The position is reinforced by the fact that the 1993
amendments to § 41-6-44.5 added subsection (1)(b) which reads as
follows:
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section
41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical test
inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath
alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when
prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
16

41-6-44.5 provides for the admission of other competent evidence.
The Court should uphold the trial court's denial Defendant's Motion
to Suppress as there was sufficient foundation to support

the

admission of the blood test results.
POINT IV: THERE WAS OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
TRIAL ASIDE FROM THE BLOOD TEST RESULTS TO SUPPORT THE
DEFENDANT'S DUI CONVICTION.
Even if this Court finds that the blood test results were
erroneously admitted into evidence, the Court must find that absent
the error, the outcome would have been more
defendant.

favorable

to the

There was overwhelming evidence introduced at trial--

aside from the blood test iresults--showing that Defendant

was

driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he could
not safely operate a motor vehicle.

The evidence

showed

the

following:
1)

Defendant was involved in an injury accident.

2)

Defendant had a distinct odor of alcohol about him.

3)
Defendant had drank at least four or five beers with
a 6% alcohol content prior to the accident.
4)
Defendant showed a lack of judgment in allowing his
daughter to ride on a bike which he knew had throttle
problems.
5)
Defendant did not want to have contact with police
or medical help after the accident.
6)
Defendant did not report his significant injuries to
the attending physician until he was informed he was to
be released.
7)
Defendant could not perform simple field sobriety
tests and showed significant impairment on the horizontal
gaze nystagmus test.
This evidence, when considered together, was more than sufficient
17

to uphold

the

jury's verdict

influence of alcohol.

of

guilty of driving under

the

See Gavin v. State, 827 S.W.2d 161 (Ark.

1992) .
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial
Court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Respectfully Submitted this 18th day of January, 1994.
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Att^ney for Plaintiff-Appellee
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ADDENDUM
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EXHIBIT ONE
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
26-1-30 (2) (r).

Powers and duties of department.
* * *

(2) In addition to all other powers and duties of the
department, it shall have and exercise the following
powers and duties:
* * *

(r)
establish
qualifications
for
individuals
permitted to draw blood pursuant to Section 41-6-44.10,
and to issue permits to individuals it finds qualified,
which permits may be terminated or revoked by the
department;

41-6-44.5.
Admissibility of chemical test results in
actions for driving under the influence.
Weight of
evidence.
(1)
In any action or proceeding in which it is
material to prove that a person was operating or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a
chemical
test
or
tests as authorized
in
Section
41.6.44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(2)
If the chemical test was taken more than two
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical
control, the test result is admissible as evidence of the
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the
alleged operating or actual physical control, but the
trier of fact shall determine what weight is given to the
result of the test.
(3)
This section does not prevent a court from
receiving
otherwise
admissible
evidence
as
to
a
defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level
at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical
control.

41-6-44.10(1) (a). Implied consent to chemical tests for
alcohol or drug - Number of tests - Refusal - Warning,
report - Hearing, revocation of license - Appeal - Person
incapable of refusal - Results of test available - Who
may give test - Evidence.
(1) (a)
A person operating a motor vehicle in this
state is considered to have given his consent to a
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for
the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited
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under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol
and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if the test is or
tests are administered at the direction of a peace
officer having grounds to believe that person to have
been operating or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-644.4, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 416-44.

41-6-44.10(5)(a).
a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical
nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting
at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw blood to
determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation
does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath
specimen.

R440-12.2. Authorized Individual - Qualifications.
Pursuant to section 26-1-30(19), Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, individuals other than physicians,
registered nurses, or practical nurses shall meet one of
the following requirements as a prerequisite for
authorization to withdraw blood for the purpose of
determining its alcoholic or drug content when requested
to do so by a peace officer.
A.
Training
in
blood
withdrawal
procedures
(venipuncture) obtained as a defined part of a
successfully completed college or university course taken
for credit, or
B.
Training
in blood
withdrawal
procedures
(venipuncture) obtained as a defined part of a
successfully completed training course which prepares
individuals to function in routine clinical or emergency
medical situations under the guidance of a physician, or
C. Training of no less than three weeks duration in
blood withdrawal procedures (venipuncture) under the
guidance of a licensed physician.
D. Individuals actively engaged in performing blood
withdrawal procedures (venipuncture) at the time these
rules become effective and who have been so engaged for
a six-month period immediately preceding the effective
date, but not meeting one of the above requirements, are
eligible for authorization by a peace officer.
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